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ABSTRACT 
This paper firstly argues that the design of security applications needs to consider more than 
technical elements.  Since almost all security systems involve human users as well as 
technology, security should be considered, and designed as, a socio-technical work system.  
Secondly, we argue that safety- critical systems design has similar goals and issues to 
security design, and should thus provide a good starting point.  Thirdly, we identify Reason's 
(1990) Generic Error Modelling System/Basic Elements of Production as the most suitable 
starting point for a socio-technical approach, and demonstrate how its basic elements can be 
applied to the domain of information security.  We demonstrate how the application of the 
model's concepts, especially the distinction between active and latent failures, offers an 
effective way of identifying and addressing security issues that involve human behaviour. 
Finally, we identify strengths and weaknesses of this approach, and the requirement for 
further work to produce a security-specific socio-technical design framework.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, the security research community has come to recognize the importance of the 
human factor in security. In an increasing number of cases, user behaviour facilitated security 
breaches, prompting Schneier (2000) to state that:  
"Security is only as good as it's weakest link, and people are the weakest 
link in the chain"  
The opposition recognized and exploited this state of affairs earlier. In his testimony to the 
US Senate committee hearing, Kevin Mitnick pointed out that he had obtained most 
passwords from unwitting users, rather than by cracking. In his lectures to IT managers, he 
has repeatedly emphasized that:  
"The human side of computer security is easily exploited and constantly 
overlooked. Companies spend millions of dollars on firewalls, encryption 
and secure access devices, and it's money wasted because none of these 
measures address the weakest link in the security chain '" (Poulsen, 2000).  
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The recognition that security involves people as well as technology is an important first step. 
However, labelling users as the "weakest link" implies that they are to blame for the current 
state of affairs. We argue that this is an unfortunate repeat of the "human error" perspective, 
which blighted the development of safety-critical systems in the mid-eighties: pilots and 
operators were blamed for accidents whenever they took a wrong action when dealing with a 
critical incident. Today, we know that pilots and operators are hardly ever careless. They are 
desperately trying to identify the right - life-saving - actions, but fail because (a) designs give 
wrong cues about the cause of the problem, (b) unattainable cognitive or physical tasks, (c) 
insufficient knowledge to identify the correct action, or (d) insufficient training to carry it out 
correctly. Adams & Sasse (1999) pointed out that security has largely failed to consider 
usability, and consequently, the demands security mechanisms make on users have been 
allowed to increase unchecked. In many environments, the demands that different security 
mechanisms place on users have become unattainable, or conflict with other elements of 
users' jobs. Furthermore, many users receive little or no training or support on security. These 
issues cause or facilitate security breaches; yet, they are not addressed by current security 
models.  
2. WHY DO WE REQUIRE A NEW MODEL?  
Traditionally, security models describe what the protection mechanism is to achieve 
(Anderson, 2001).  
1. The BelI-LaPadula model (Bell & LaPadula, 1973) aims to enforce the principle of 
confidentiality, and describes the basic functions of a multilevel-secure system. There 
are two basic rules: (l) no read up, and (2) no write down. A process may not read 
data that is at a higher security classification than itself, and may not write data at a 
security classification lower than itself.  
2. The BIBA policy model (Biba, 1977) aims to enforce the principle of integrity. It is 
an upside-down version of Bell-LaPadula, where processes may not read data of a 
lower classification than themselves, and may not write data to a higher level than 
themselves. Instead of being a constraint primarily on who can read something, it is a 
constraint on who can write or alter something.  
3. The Clark-Wilson (Clark and Wilson, 1987) security model is a formalisation of 
banking and accounting procedures, such as double-entry bookkeeping. It ensures, 
among other things, that transactions maintain balance, and that they can be 
reconstructed.  
We argue that these models do not predict, or address security problems that can be observed 
in everyday use. Consider the following examples of problems with one specific security 
mechanism, passwords:  
1. Conflicting security and task demands. Adams and Sasse (1999) found that users 
circumvent password mechanisms (sharing and disclosure of passwords) because they 
conflict with users' task demands and working practices. Models such as BLP rely on 
authentication being carried out correctly and legitimately, but they make no 
allowance for the need to adapt procedures to fit an individual's or organization's 
primary task.  
2. Unattainable cognitive demands. With the increasing number of systems, users are 
increasingly unable to cope with the number of passwords or the rules that govern 
their use (Adams & Sasse, 1999); as a result, the cost of re- setting passwords has 
been escalating in many organizations. Existing security models such as BLP, Clark-
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Wilson and BIBA design security on a per-system basis, and do not address 
authentication for multiple systems.  
3. Lack of user training and support. Many users in Adams and Sasse's (1999) study 
did not appreciate how crackers attempt to break into computer systems, and so chose 
easy to break passwords. Models such as BLP do not explain or predict this type of 
vulnerability, and so have little to contribute to its solution.  
4. Lack of security management. 30% of managers in a large technology company 
reported that their last password reset was due to "circumstances beyond their 
control" (Sasse et al., 2001). Causes identified include (a) being away from base for 
long enough that their accounts were suspended, b) server upgrades, and (c) 
automated remote disc mounting features of operating systems. Current security 
models do not cover management of authentication in longer-term, real-world use.  
5. Distribution of hardware and data. Security problems resulting from lost or stolen 
laptops are common today, e.g. the laptop stolen after a presentation from the 
chairman of QUALCOMM (Lemos, 2000). Laptops belonging to key staff contain 
commercially sensitive data (e.g. relating to a potential merger or takeover). BLP does 
not apply here, because physical access to the hard disk can be used to bypass access 
control mechanisms. For BLP to work in this case, a mechanism would be needed that 
automatically encrypts any data transferred to a laptop or other external system (we 
hypothesize that many users would not use encryption voluntarily). However, most 
laptops are used with off-the-shelf operating systems that do not provide such security 
features.  
These examples show how the current approach of designing security on a per-system basis 
creates a system where users - like pilots and operators in the eighties - are put in situations 
where they will inevitably fail. Sasse et al. (2001) conclude that designers of security 
systems, need to recognize that security is a socio-technical system:, and that all parts of the 
system and the way they interact need to be included to achieve effective security.  
The concept of survivability (Lipson and Fisher, 1999) has a wider view than traditional 
security models, and could be applied to all of the scenarios presented above. However, 
survivability is concerned with what to do after the breach has occurred, not preventing it or 
its recurrence. A new model is still required, which will be complimentary to existing 
perspectives.  
3. THE CASE FOR ADAPTING SAFETY MODELS FOR SECURITY 
3.1 Similarities Between Safety and Security Domains 
Both safety and security contain all of the basic elements of production, which are core 
components of the new model (see next section for a description of these components). Both 
safety and security are secondary goals: they exist to protect an organization and its staff 
while they are engaged in the primary task - production.  
3.1.1 Economics  
The goals of safety and security are compatible with the goals of production - in the long-
term. To continue producing, an organization needs to be both safe and secure. Given that 
resources are finite, there are likely to be many occasions in which there arc short-term 
conflicts of interest between production and either safety or security. Resources allocated 
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toward production are likely to diminish those available for either safety or security, and vice 
versa. This resource allocation dilemma is exacerbated by:  
1. The certainty of outcome. Resources aimed at improving productivity have relatively 
certain outcomes; those aimed at enhancing safety or security do not - at least in the 
short-term. This is because both safety and security breaches are due in large part to 
stochastic elements.  
2. The nature of feedback. The feedback generated by the pursuit of production goals is 
generally unambiguous, rapid, compelling and highly reinforcing (when the news is 
good). The feedback associated with the pursuit of safety and security goals is largely 
negative, intermittent, often deceptive, and perhaps only compelling after a major 
accident or string of incidents. The same could be said of security. Production 
feedback will always speak louder than safety or security feedback., except on rare 
occasions. This makes the managerial control of safety/security extremely difficult.  
To aid in this difficult task, both safety and security have developed techniques that attempt 
to assess the probability that system breaches will happen. Both disciplines assign values to 
the consequences of these events. In both fields, the expected frequency and severity of these 
events can be translated into an expected loss, and this value can be used in a cost benefit 
analysis to select between protective interventions. 
3.1.2 Attribution of failure 
In both safety and security, defensive filters may be interposed between decision-makers and 
'bad news.' As a result, safety or security problems may be blamed on operator carelessness 
or incompetence. This, in turn, may encourage management to respond with punitive actions 
towards staff, rather than address the underlying problem. This (unhelpful) position is further 
consolidated by cataloguing the engineered safety devices/security mechanisms, and safe 
operating practices/security policies that have already been implemented.  
3.2 Differences Between the Domains 
It is sometimes argued that a major difference between these domains is that safety failures 
are frequently accidents, whereas security breaches are often deliberate (and so are likely to 
happen again and again). This difference is greatly reduced if we assume that the system 
exists in a dangerous world. When we focus on the victim/end-user (as a computer security 
policy must do) instead of the perpetrator/external cracker, we see that safety and security 
breaches will happen unless the victim takes appropriate steps to avoid them.  
For example: crossing the street is dangerous whether or not drivers are trying to run you 
down. In both the safety (unintended collision) and security (assassination by car) versions of 
this scenario, the way to avoid the breach is to cross when there are no cars coming. In either 
version, ignoring the vulnerability (fast moving vehicles in your path) is likely to result in a 
serious injury. From this perspective, the two domains are similar and the basic aetiologies of 
breaches are the same: committing unintended actions, or committing intended actions with 
the wrong goal (where the goal is not to cause an injury, or to cause a security breach).  
The meaning that the society places upon intended breaches from inside the system however 
is different in some instances between safety and security. In most instances, violations of 
safety rules are not applauded. In many cases, violations of security rules are applauded. For 
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example, there is a tradition of individuals releasing information about security flaws to the 
press either to gain publicity (the publicity attack- Schneier, 2000) or in the public interest. 
Sasse et al. (2001) report that being able to flaunt "petty" security regulations is a badge of 
seniority in many organizations.  
4. A SPECIFIC SAFETY MODEL  
In our view, Reason's Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) is a comprehensive model 
for ensuring safety in organizations. It is a model that is informed by a detailed understanding 
of both individual (cognitive) and organizational (social) characteristics that direct user 
behaviour (i.e. the Basic Elements of Production). We describe the model in two sections: 
firstly, failures at the individual (user) level, and secondly, failures at the system 
(organizational) level.  
4.1 GEMS and Active Failures 
The model posits three kinds of human error. Active failure, or active errors occur at the level 
of individuals (operators) in the system. In the security domain, the operators are end-users of 
computer systems in a large corporation.  There are three error types:  
• slips (attentional failures),  
• lapses (memory failures) 
unintended actions that lead to a bad result; and  
• mistakes (rule-based or knowledge-based mistakes) intended actions that lead to an 
unintended result.  
Together with the traditional focus of computer security  
• violations another intended action, however one that leads to a result that the user 
wishes, but other people do not  
these form the class of unsafe acts (which in the domain of information security we re-label 
as unsecure acts). 
4.2 Latent Failures, and Basic Elements of Production 
For an accident (disaster, or security breach) to occur, unsecure acts must combine with latent 
failures and or unusual environmental conditions. On their own, unsecure acts are necessary, 
but not sufficient to cause system disasters. A consequence of this is that the model assumes 
that security breaches are due to people inside the organization, even if they are initiated by 
external agencies such as crackers, natural disasters, etc.  
Latent failures can be thought of as something like resident pathogens. They are weaknesses 
built into the system, which predispose the system to disasters. Using the previous example 
of being run down by a car whilst crossing the road, the unsecure act of not checking for 
oncoming traffic combines with the latent failure in the system of not having a pedestrian 
bridge to produce a disaster.  
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Latent failures act by promoting unsecure acts and weakening the system's defences. As with 
pathogen-related diseases, the catastrophic breakdown of complex, opaque technical 
installations requires the breaching of defences by combinations of resident pathogens and 
sometimes bizarre local triggering events (Figure 2). Other things being equal, the system is 
likely to have more resident pathogens if it is more complex, interactive, tightly coupled, and 
opaque. However, while simpler systems are usually less interactive, less centralized, and 
more transparent, they tend to have fewer built-in defences. As a result, relatively few 
pathogens can wreak greater havoc in simpler systems than in more advanced ones.  
Having the concept of a latent failure as something that predisposes a system to security 
breaches necessitates some definition of system. A system or organization is described in the 
model in the following way (Figure 1.):  
• decision-makers direct the organization at a strategic level (chairmans, VPs, etc.), and  
• line managers implement the strategies. This implementation creates the  
• preconditions (reliable equipment of the right kind, a skilled and motivated 
workforce, appropriate: attitudes, motivators, work schedules, maintenance programs, 
environmental conditions, codes of practice and policies, etc.) for  
• productive activities which are the activities the organization carries out to attain its 
payoff, e.g. Internet service provision.  
• defences protect the organization, such as: uninterruptible power supplies, firewalls, 
virtual private networking, data backups, generators, sprinkler systems, etc.  
The causes of a disaster, or security breach, can be traced to failures at all levels listed in this 
model. To indicate this, the model has been relabelled appropriately (Figure 2).  
A useful way for thinking about how deficiencies at a higher level are transformed into 
deficiencies at a lower level is as failure types converting into failure tokens (Hudson, 1988). 
For example, the line management deficiency of insufficient training is a pathogen type or 
failure type that manifests itself in the plane of psychological precursor of unsecure acts 
(Figure 2) as a variety of failure tokens. This cascade effect (Figure 3) is the basis of the 
assertion that removing latent errors in higher parts of the system is more beneficial than 
removing errors further downstream (because these downstream errors are then prevented). 
This cascade effect can be included in a cost / benefit analysis to prioritize possible 
interventions.  
4.3 Adapting the Model for Security 
An immediate problem in the adaptation of this model to security is the precondition that 
there is "reliable equipment of the right kind". Commentators have suggested that such 
hardware and software does not exist in practice, and that economic realities make their 
development infeasible (e.g. Schneier, 2000). However, the reliance: of much of information 
security on a trusted computing base is an acknowledged and as yet unresolved problem (cf. 
Baker, 1996).  
We have given an outline of the model and provided some arguments why it might apply to 
security. How exactly can it be translated to the domain of security? How do we define 
different parts of the model? In particular, how do we decide which actions are active 
failures, and which are latent?  
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For example: most users do not look at the information about the login history of their UNIX 
account when they log in. Because of this, a user will be unable to detect when somebody 
used his account in the middle of the night. Is it an active failure? If the user's locus of 
attention was not on the information as it was presented, it could be argued that this 
behaviour is due to a failure of attention. This is the definition of an active failure, therefore 
the action must be an active failure. However, the fact that the user regularly does not attend 
to the information when presumably he is meant to suggests that this is a violation. 
Commonplace violation of safety protocols to achieve greater efficiency is the definition of 
routine violation. However, not attending to the information that is displayed could be argued 
to be similar to not performing maintenance. It is an error that predisposes the system to 
disaster-by not attending to the information, the user reduces the probability that a cracker 
will be caught alter compromising the system. The user has made the system more 
vulnerable, and this is the definition of a latent failure.  
Because instances of activity or inactivity may be hard to classify, it would seem appropriate 
to apply every category to every instance of activity, and then decide at which part of the 
model to intervene. Though in theory it would be desirable to intervene against all possible 
interpretations of the causes of unsecure actions, in practice it will be necessary for 
researchers to pick interventions based on budgets, time available, skills available, etc. The 
model guides us to consider the multifaceted and cascading nature of security problems so 
that we may better decide what should be done to solve them.  
5. EVALUATION OF MODEL  
We have given examples where traditional models of information security cannot explain or 
predict important security vulnerabilities or breaches. We have described the new model and 
its transfer to the domain of information security. In the sections below we will apply the new 
model to an example security breach, examine what the model gives us and also its 
advantages and disadvantages.  
5.I An Example of the Model In Use  
We now return to one of our previous examples of a security breach-the theft of laptops, and 
our conjecture that most users will avoid use of encryption software. We will attempt to 
apply the new model to this example. This application will begin by considering each of the 
unsecure acts and using them to label the chairman's behaviour. We will then step through the 
other planes of the model (Figure 2) in turn, from psychological precursors of unsecure acts, 
through line management deficiencies, to wrong decisions at board level.  
Let us assume a company has policies that mandate the encryption of sensitive information 
such as mergers and acquisition (M&A) information - both when stored locally and 
transmitted by email. When the chairman, for instance, breaches this security rule, he 
commits a violation. Presumably, the chairman does not intend for the sensitive information 
to fall into the wrong hands, so we may rule out sabotage. It is more likely that the chairman 
did not use any encryption software as a matter of course. This is classed as a routine 
violation. The key component of unsecure actions of this kind is motivation, particularly the 
search for efficiency. Unusable security mechanisms not only lead to unsecure user 
behaviour, but also affect user perception of the value and importance of security (Adams and 
Sasse, 1999). When public key encryption features are added, many users are unable to use 
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them properly (Whitten and Tygar, 1999). However, here we deal only with the symmetric 
encryption of locally stored material, and assume that the chairman is able to use this 
software successfully but is unwilling to do so.  
Although conventional Human-Computer Interaction (HCI, or Human Factors Engineering) 
research may not directly tackle user motivation, it does so indirectly by reducing user 
workload and costs, and/or increasing task quality (Sasse et al., 2001). If we consider the task 
of using symmetric encryption software, we find that the greatest user workload is caused by 
user authentication. Let us assume that the chairman believes that encrypting files is too 
costly for him, and the workload of authentication is part of the reason for this. Each time a 
file is encrypted or decrypted, authentication must take place. When encrypting a file, some 
authentication token has to be applied so that the file can only be decrypted by authorized 
people (who are able to apply the same authentication key to the file).  
In most encryption software, authentication is carried out via a password mechanism. The use 
of passwords is associated with several user costs: task completion is delayed by the time 
required to respond appropriately to the password dialog, and mental effort is required to 
recall the password. The effort required is particularly acute when the user is generating a 
password. Most security password policies (usually based on Federal Information Processing 
Guidelines FIPS, 1985) mandate that each separate encryption should have a different 
password. This dramatically increases user workload. The chairman is part of a system that 
predisposes him to breach security. Although passwords have many advantages as an 
authentication mechanism, their proliferation tends to reduce their effectiveness. This can be 
seen at help desks in Internet service providers and IT dependent organizations, where up to 
half of all Help-Desk calls are password-related (Murrer, 1999). This can become a 
significant financial burden.  
There are other authentication by knowledge mechanisms, such as:  
• PassfacesTM (http://www.idasts.com/)  
• graphical passwords (Jermyn et al., 1999)  
• pass sentences (Specter, 1994),  
• pass algorithms (Haskett, 1984).  
There are other paradigms of authentication using: what people possess (keys, tokens, smart 
cards, etc), what people are (structural biometrics such as hand geometry, fingerprints, retina 
scans, etc.) and what people do (behavioural biometrics such as signatures, voice prints, 
keystroke dynamics, etc). These authentication mechanisms will not be appropriate in many 
cases for reasons of economy, user acceptance, or task compatibility. However, let us assume 
that a risk assessment has been carried out which shows that the loss of information stored on 
a senior manager’s laptop far outweighs the costs of implementing alternate security 
measures for such a small group of users. By selecting encryption software which uses 
passwords instead of less burdensome authentication mechanisms, a latent error is designed 
into the system.  
What insight do we gain if we consider the chairman's actions to be a mistake? There are two 
types of mistake. The first type is the misapplication of a good role. One such might be, "I am 
the boss, therefore nobody will mess with my laptop”. In the company HQ, this is a good rule 
that works well. Unfortunately, in the auditorium of a convention center, this rule can be 
considered to have been misapplied.  
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The second type of mistake is the application of bad rules. In this instance, the rule might 
have been something like "I am in a public space in view of many people, therefore I will not 
be robbed". This is clearly a bad rule, because its contents may be generally considered to be 
wrong.  
The next error type is the lapse; managers are busy people and moreover, a public 
presentation is an additional source of stress. In such conditions, the chairman could have 
been distracted at the moment he was going to encrypt the sensitive data on his laptop. This 
distraction caused him to momentarily lose track of what he was doing, and therefore miss 
out the step of clicking the encrypt button.  
The final error type is the slip. Particularly under conditions of stress, but also more generally 
it is always possible to make some small slip in an action sequence. Intending to press the 
encrypt button, the chairman might have pressed the sign button, or selected another 
document that he had been working on and encrypting that instead of the intended one.  
Stepping through the other planes of the model we first look at the psychological precursors 
of these unsecure acts (plane two of Figure 1). The chairman believed that the costs of 
encrypting the contents of his laptop outweighed the risk of the laptop being stolen. The 
chairman was accustomed to being in a physically secure area. The chairman's priority was 
his performance at the podium at the conference, not the security of his laptop. Encryption 
software uses password authentication, instead of a mechanism with fewer user costs.  
Turning now to line management deficiencies (plane 3), the manager in charge of arranging 
the visit did not hire a security guard for the chairman and his laptop. The security 
department had not audited the chairman's laptop, or installed appropriate encryption 
software or other resource denial functionality in it. The wrong decisions that led to these 
problems (plane 4) were probably the board seeing security as a financial burden, or a box to 
be ticked rather than an essential part of the business.  
The paragraphs above give us an example of the use of the model, moving the finger of 
blame from the end user and pointing it throughout the organization. It also illustrates the 
cascade effect that problems higher up in the organization can have on the ground; error types 
being turned into error tokens.  
5.2 What Does It Give Us? 
Applying the model has helped to identify several different potential causes of or 
contributory factors to a security breach, and measures that could be taken to prevent them. 
Moreover, the model identifies hierarchies of causes, where elimination of particular 
vulnerabilities can remove several others further down the line.  
Rather than being the main instigators of an accident, operators tend to be the inheritors of 
system defects created by poor design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance and bad 
management decisions. To paraphrase Reason (1990), they usually only provide the final 
garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have already been long in the cooking.  
10 years ago, the safety-critical systems community became aware that attempts to discover 
and neutralize these latent failures will have a greater beneficial effect upon system safety 
than more localized efforts to minimize active errors. The security community is now 
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becoming aware that a view that is systematically wider than its traditional models is 
necessary. We suggest that a view of similar scope as the safety community's is necessary for 
security.  
To date, much of the work of information security specialists has been directed at improving 
the secure transmission and storage of data. While this is undeniably an important enterprise, 
it only addresses a relatively small part of the total security problem, being aimed primarily at 
reducing the technical preconditions tip of the causal iceberg. One thing that has been 
profitably learned over the past few years is that, in regards to safety issues, the term "human 
factors" embraces a far wider range of individuals and activities than those associated with 
the frontline operation of the system. Indeed, a central theme of this work is that the more 
removed individuals are from these frontline activities (and, incidentally, from direct 
hazards), the greater is their potential danger to the system. We argue that this is also the case 
for security, and that the model presented here gives the security community a model of 
suitable scope.  
5.3 Advantages 
We have identified the following advantages of adapting the safety model to security:  
1. It reminds us that there is more to security than software and mathematics; there are 
people too, and their interactions with the above and each other.  
2. The model avoids premature formalization (of. Dobson, 1993)  
3. The model contains an enterprise description, which LaPadula (1993) has identified 
as a desirable property.  
4. It situates the user in the context of the organization, rather than treating the user as a 
single unit devoid of context (Dobson, 1993).  
5. Non-technical and social aspects such as organizational procedures and training arc an 
essential part of the model, not an ancillary to it (of. Dobson, 1993).  
6. The model points to the area of security that is weakest, and where therefore the 
largest gains can be made.  
7. The model gives the context for lower-level models such as BLP.  
8. The model argues that information security should be given more status and 
resources.  
5.4 Disadvantages 
We currently see the following disadvantages:  
1. The model depends on a trustworthy hardware and software foundation, in common 
with other models (of. Baker, 1996).  
2. The model is not easy to operationalise; the quality of its application depends on the 
expertise of the people who apply it within a particular organization. Again, this is 
also true for most other security models.  
3. The model tells you which things are wrong, what appropriate goals are but not how 
to achieve them. This is similar to other models of security.  
4. The model is currently under-specified: it does not list all of the important variables. 
However, this paper only represents a demonstration of the feasibility and first 
benefits of adapting the model to security -further work will be needed to generate a 
comprehensive model.  
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5.5 Further work 
We see the following opportunities for further work:  
• Integrating the model with existing security design and evaluation techniques.  
• Applying the model to security issues other than user- authentication.  
• Testing its validity for the design of new systems and for interventions in existing 
systems - is it better for design or redesign?  
• Testing the scope of the model - is it helpful for security breaches at all levels of 
severity no matter how small, or only for disasters (which were the subject of the 
original model)?  
6. SUMMARY 
Reason's (1990) GEMS and the basic elements of production form a model that explained 
and predicted accidents in complex technical installations. We have demonstrated the 
feasibility of applying this model to the domain of information security. Our model is 
sufficiently general to encompass more traditional models of security such as BLP and CW, 
as well as their goals. We put two important classes of phenomena forward: active and latent 
failures. By focusing on latent failures in the system, we propose that security is better 
improved than by concentrating on the active failures of end-users. The model concentrates 
on the human components of work systems, which have been described as the weakest link in 
the security chain (Schneier, 2000). By focusing on the most important part of this area of 
weakness, it focuses on the area where the greatest gains can be made.  
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Safeguards against foreseeable hazards (when productive activities 
involve exposure to natural or intrinsic hazards both individuals and 
machines should be supplied with safeguards sufficient to prevent 
foreseeable injury, damage or costly outages) 
2. Productive activities 
Integration of human and mechanical elements (actual 
performances of humans and machines: the precise 
synchronisation of mechanical and human activities in order to 
deliver the right product at the right time). 
3. Preconditions  
Prerequisites for successful production that lie between line 
managers and productive activities.  Qualities possessed by both 
machines and people: 
3.1. Reliable equipment of the right kind 
3.2. A skilled and knowledgeable workforce 
3.3. An appropriate set of attitudes and motivators 
3.4. Work schedules 
3.5. Maintenance programmes and 
3.6. Environmental conditions that permit efficient and 
safe operations; and 
3.7. Codes of practice that are clear guidance regarding 
desirable (safe and/or efficient) and undesirable 
(unsafe and/or inefficient) performance 
To name but a few 
4. Line management 
Departmental specialists who implement the strategies of the 








4.8. Engineering support 
4.9. Personnel 
Etc. 
5. Decision makers 
Plant and corporate management – the architects and high-level 
managers of the system. 
They: 
5.1. Set the goals for the system as a whole and 
5.2. Direct, at a strategic level, the means by which goals 
should be met.  A large part of this is 
5.3. Allocating finite resources such as, 
5.3.1. Money, 
5.3.2. Equipment, 
5.3.3. People (talent and expertise) and 
5.3.4. Time, 































LIMITED WINDOWS OF 
BREACH OPPORTUNITY 
• Unusable authentication 
• No guard 
• Unusable encryption 
software 
• No tracking device 
• Failing to encrypt data 
• No bios password 
• Leaving laptop unattended 
• Failing to encrypt data 
• No bios password 
• Weak login password 
• Login password used on 
the internet 
• Stress of giving a presentation 
• Lack of feelings of personal risk 
• Previous unsecure acts 
unpunished 
• Poor staff training 
• Inappropriate procurement 
• Security given low priority 
• Press call 
















































































Figure 3 - The relationship between error types and error tokens. 
